Abstract. In this paper we present simple example of propositional logic which has one modal operator and is based on intuitionistic core. This system is very weak in modal sense -e.g. rules of regularity or monotonicity do not hold. It has complete semantics composed of possible worlds equipped with neighborhoods and pre-order relation. We discuss certain restrictions imposed on those structures. Also, we present characterization of axiom 4 known from logic S4 .
Introduction
Intuitionistic modal logics are often interpreted in terms of bi-relational structures. Such frames contain two relations between possible worlds: ≤ (pre-order, responsible for the intuitionistic aspect of logic) and R (modal reachability). This approach was widely investigated in [1] , [8] and [7] . In [9] we established sound and complete semantics based on the notion of neighborhoods. In fact, we modified typical neighborhood semantics for intuitionism (presented in [5] ) by removing superset axiom. Thus, we could speak not only about minimal neighborhoods of worlds -but also about maximal ones. We assumed that w ϕ iff ϕ is satisfied in each world of maximal w-neighborhood. This definition (similar to the one used by Kojima in [3] ) was closely related with well-known relational definition of necessity (both for classical and intuitionistic systems) which states that w ϕ iff ϕ is satisfied in each world visible from w in modal sense.
In the present paper our approach is different -close to the typical neighborhood definition. Thus we assume (among other conditions) that formula ϕ is forced in w iff the whole V (ϕ) belongs to the family of w-neighborhoods. In our earlier research we could quite easily transform neighborhood structures into bi-relational frames. Now we do not even expect such duality -because our aim is to point out those features of neighborhoods which cannot be simulated (at least in any easy way) by relational structures.
Definition 3.2. pn1 -model is a quadruple W, N , ≤, V where W, N , ≤ is pn1 -frame and V is a function from P V into P (W ) such that: if w ∈ V (q) and w ≤ v then v ∈ V (q).
Definition 3.3. For every pn1 -model M = W, N , ≤, V , forcing of formulas in a world w ∈ W is defined inductively:
As we can see, ϕ is forced if V (ϕ) ∈ N w (just like in the classical approach)
but we also require that ϕ should be satisfied in an intuitionistic sense. Thus, we obtain theorem about monotonicity of forcing:
Proof. The proof goes by induction over the complexity of formulas. Almost all cases are easy (or rather just like in standard intuitionistic calculus). Thus, we shall discuss only the modal case.
Assume that ϕ = γ. Suppose that w ϕ. Thus w γ and {z ∈ W ; z γ} ∈ N w . Let us take v ∈ W such that w ≤ v. Of course v ϕ (by induction hypothesis). Thus, v ∈ {z ∈ W ; z γ} -which means that v ∈ X ∈ N w . From (1) we can say that X = V (γ) ∈ N v . Hence, v γ and finally v ϕ.
3.3.
About bi-relational approach. In general, there is no universal standard of bi-relational approach for intuitionistic modal logics. There are however some clues or some popular and widely accepted notions. For example, many authors agree that forcing of ϕ should be defined in a following way:
It means that formula ϕ should be accepted in each world which is reachable from w by means of relation R (modal reachability or visibility). One could say that in our system we should use another, slightly more complicated clause (to hold connection with our basic definition): w ϕ ⇔ w ϕ and for each v ∈ W such that wRv, v ϕ
Be as it may, we can show that in general it is impossible to transform an arbitrary pn1 -model into the bi-relational one. For this, we use simple argument presented by Pacuit in [6] for classical modal setting. Suppose that we have pn1 -model
{w, v}, V (ψ) = {w} and ≤ is empty. Now we can say that w (ϕ ∧ ψ) -because w ϕ ∧ ψ and {z ∈ W ; z ϕ ∧ ψ} = {w} ∈ N w . At the same time, w ϕ because {z ∈ W ; z ϕ} = {w, v} / ∈ N w .
Assume now that we leave our worlds and valuation without any changes but we have certain modal relation R ⊆ W × W and we use second clause to define forcing of necessity. We want to say that w R ϕ (while w R (ϕ ∧ ψ)). It gives us disjunction of two options. First, w R ϕ. Then w R ϕ ∧ ψ and thus
Contradiction. Second, there is z ∈ W such that wRz and z R ϕ.
Suppose that z is w. Then we repeat earlier reasoning. So, check z = v. If v R ϕ and wRv then we cannot say that conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ is accepted in each world
Of course this example is in fact classical -but undoubtedly it works fine with our intuitionistic definitions.
Axiomatization of our system
In this section we present sound axiomatization of our logic. Below we show its components:
Definition 4.1. The mIT -logic is the following set of formulas and rules: IPC ∪ {T , MP } where:
(1) IPC is the set of all intuitionistic axiom schemes and their modal instances (2) T is the axiom scheme ϕ → ϕ
The following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.2. mIT is sound with respect to the class of all pn1 -models.
Proof. It is easy to check that axioms and rules of IPC are satisfied. Let us check axiom T . Suppose that there is pn1 -model M with w ∈ W such that w T .
Thus we have v ∈ W , w ≤ v such that v ϕ but v ϕ for certain ϕ. But from the definition of forcing we have immediately that v ϕ. Contradiction.
It can be fruitful to show explicitly that some well-known axioms and rules do not hold in our structures: 
Completeness and canonical model
In this section we prove completeness of the system mIT with respect to the class of all pn1 -frames. At first, we introduce certain basic definitions and lemmas.
5.1. Useful lemmas.
Definition 5.1. mIT -theory is a set of well-formed formulas which contains all axioms and is closed under deduction.
Attention: later we shall omit symbols mIT and pn1 for convenience. The next lemma is quite standard and can be considered as a semantic version of deduction theorem.
Lemma 5.2. (see [3] , Lemma A.1) If w is a theory then ϕ → ψ ∈ w ⇔ ψ ∈ v for all theories v such that w∪{ϕ} ⊆ v.
Proof. (sketch)
The proof is easy. ⇒ direction requires only MP rule and ⇐ is based on the analysis of set v = {ψ; ϕ → ψ ∈ w} and axiom µ → (ϕ → µ).
In the next point we introduce the notion of prime (or relatively maximal ) theory, repeating standard definition from intuitionistic calculus.
Definition 5.3.
A theory w is said to be prime if it satisfies the following conditions:
Lemma 5.4. Each consistent theory w γ (which does not contain formula γ) can be extended to the prime theory w ′ γ .
Proof. (sketch)
The proof is rather standard and it does not require any specific features of our logic. The first thing is to use Lindenbaum's lemma (or well-known methods for countable languages) which allows us to extend w γ to the relatively maximal w ′ γ . The second thing is to prove that w ′ γ is actually prime. It is enough to prove that γ ∈ w ′ γ ∪ {ϕ} (resp. w ′ γ ∪ {ψ}) where by X we mean deductive closure of the set of formulas X. It is important that we use semantic deduction theorem in this proof. (1) W is the set of all prime theories (2) for every w, v ∈ W we say that w ≤ v iff w ⊆ v (3) N is a function from W into P (P (W )) such that for every w ∈ W and for each formula ϕ: N w = {{z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z}; ϕ ∈ w}.
(4) V : P V → P (W ) is a function defined as it follows: w ∈ V (q) ⇔ q ∈ w Note that we can say:
Remark 5.6. In each can-pn1 -model: if X ⊆ W , then X ∈ N w ⇔ there is a formula ϕ such that X = {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} and ϕ ∈ w.
Remark 5.7. In each can-pn1 -model: {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} ∈ N w ⇔ ϕ ∈ w.
One could ask (see [6] ) if it possible that {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} = {z ∈ W ; ψ ∈ z} and ϕ ∈ w but ψ / ∈ w. Surely, it would spoil our definition. Thus we prove the following two lemmas:
Lemma 5.8. Assume that W is a collection of all prime theories of mIT . Suppose now that {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} = {z ∈ W ; ψ ∈ z}. Then ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ, i.e. ϕ ↔ ψ ∈ mIT .
Proof. Suppose that ϕ ↔ ψ. We can assume (without loss of generality) that ϕ → ψ, so ϕ → ψ / ∈ mIT . From lemma 5.2 there exists theory v such that ϕ ∈ v but ψ / ∈ v. By means of lemma 5.4 we can expand v to the prime theory t such that ψ / ∈ v (of course, ϕ ∈ t). But now t ∈ {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} -so, as we assumed, (⇐). Assume that ϕ ∈ w. From T we have that ϕ ∈ w. Now by the definition of N we can say that {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} ∈ w. But then (by induction hypothesis) w ϕ and {z ∈ W ; z ϕ} ∈ N w . Thus w ϕ.
Theorem 5.12. mIT is complete with respect to the class of all pn1 -frames.
Proof. Suppose that w is a theory and w ϕ. In particular this means that ϕ / ∈ w.
Then we can extend w to the prime theory v such that w ⊆ v and ϕ / ∈ v. Of course for each ψ ∈ w, we have ψ ∈ v. Now we use lemma 5.11 to say that v ψ and v ϕ. The last statement means in particular that ϕ is not a semantical consequence of w.
Additional restriction.
Let us consider the following condition imposed on our models:
This restriction is stronger than (1). We can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.13. In can-pn1 -model condition (2) is valid.
Proof. Suppose that we have prime theories w, v such that w ⊆ v. Consider an arbitrary X ∈ N w . Of course, by the definition of neighborhood in canonical model, X = {z ∈ W ; ϕ ∈ z} for certain ϕ such that ϕ ∈ w. If w ⊆ v, then
The last result means that we can limit completeness of mIT to the class of all pn1 -frames satisfying (2). We shall call them pn2 -frames (models).
One could say that in the presence of (2) we may simplify our definition of forcing -without violating monotonicity. In fact, we can introduce the following definition:
This approach is identical with the classical one. Note, however, that now we have different logic which is not equivalent with mIT . For example, axiom T does not hold. This system is just intuitionism with modal rule of extensionality.
Possibility operator
In this section we work with pn2 -frames. Our goal is to establish sensible notion of possibility operator ∇. We propose the following definition:
w ∇ϕ ⇔ there are X ∈ N w and z ∈ X such that z ϕ Proof. Of course pn2 -models are subclass of pn1 -models. Thus we do not check monotonicity for ∧, ∨, → and . But let us assume that w ∇γ and w ≤ v. Then there is X ∈ N w such that for certain z ∈ X we have z γ. Now X ∈ N v so we can say that v ∇ϕ.
Note that we have explicitly used the fact that N w ⊆ N v . One can check that monotonicity of forcing holds (in pn2 -models) also with the following interpretation of possibility:
w ♦ϕ ⇔ for each X ∈ N w there is z ∈ X such that z ϕ However, the second approach is quite problematic. While ϕ → ∇ϕ is true, then we cannot say the same about ϕ → ♦ϕ. Roughly speaking, guarantees us that the set of all worlds satisfying ϕ is one of the w-neighborhoods. But it does not guarantee that in each w-neighborhood we shall find world satisfying ϕ.
Question of axiom 4
Axiom 4 (i. e. ϕ → ϕ) is typical for propositional system S4 , introduced by Lewis. In standard neighborhood setting for classical modal logics this formula corresponds to the following condition (see [4] ):
We shall show that this restriction is too weak for characterization of 4 in our environment. Let us consider the following pn1 -model M = {W, ≤, N , V }:
One can easily check that M is a proper pn1 -model which satisfies (⋆). Now we can say that v ϕ because v ϕ and {x ∈ W ; x ϕ} = {v, u} ∈ N v . On the other hand, v ϕ because {x ∈ W ; x ϕ} = {v} / ∈ N v .
For this reason we have found another characterization:
Lemma 7.1. Axiom 4 holds in pn1 -model M iff M satisfies the following condition:
Proof. Assume that pn1 -model M = {W, ≤, N , V } satisfies (⋆⋆) and there is w ∈ W such that w ϕ. Hence, w ϕ and X = {x ∈ W ; x ϕ} ∈ N w . But Y = {x ∈ W ; x ϕ} ⊆ X -and thus Y ∈ N w . So by the definition of forcing w ϕ.
As for the other direction, we can use earlier counter-example. Clearly, it does not satisfy (⋆⋆).
Further investigations
This paper should be considered only as a short introduction into research of weak modal logics based on intuitionistic core. There are still many opened questions. For example, it would be interesting to obtain completeness results for weak bi-modal intuitionistic logics, i.e. with possibility operator (defined as here or in a different way). Also, it would be fruitful to characterize various frame conditions by means of formulas (still with completeness). What is important from our point of view, is to use additional tools (axioms, restrictions on frames etc.) without going "too far". In other words, we do not want "too strong" logics (even if notions of modal "weakness" and "strongness" are somewhat unclear or arbitrary). Finally, there is also another interesting task: to combine modalities (and neighborhoods) with subintuitionistic systems (in non-trivial way). As far as we know, the area of subintuitionistic modal logics is almost terra incognita.
